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COMPUTING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS:
RECENT JUDICIAL GUIDELINES
INTRODUCTION
Concomitant with the increase of public interest litigation in
recent years, particularly in the fields of antitrust, environmental,
and civil rights law, has been an increase in attorney's fee awards.
Such awards represent legislative and judicial departures from the
traditional American rule that no attorney's fees will be awarded
in a civil suit.' In awarding attorney's fees, courts have relied upon
the directives of mandatory 2 or discretionary3 statutes, or upon one
of the judicially-created exceptions to the American rule. 4 The
judicially-created exceptions are the vexatious conduct rule, 5
 which
is simply a punitive sanction, 6 the common fund doctrine,' and the
private attorney general theory. 8
 The rationale underlying judicial
recognition of the common fund and the private attorney general
exceptions to the American rule has been expressed by the Supreme
See Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967); C.
McCormick, Law of Damages § 60, at 234-46 (1935); Comment, Liability for Attorney's Fees
in the Federal Courts—The Private Attorney Genera] Exception, 16 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 201 (1975).
2
 E.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act § 16(2), 49
U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970); Railway Labor Act § 3(p), 45 U.S.C. 153(p) (1970).
3 E.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11k(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title VII, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970); Fair Housing Act, Title VIII, § 812,
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
The power of the court to grant such fees derives from its power to do equity. Sprague
v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).
5 A court may award attorney's fees under the vexatious conduct rule where a party has
acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 6 J. Moore, Federal
Practice 11 .54.77[2], at 1709 (2d ed. 1974) and see cases cited therein. However, recent
decisions indicate that courts prefer to justify a grant of counsel fees on a benefit conferred
upon the public—the private attorney general theory. Thus, in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Stipp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), although the court found that the defendants' failure to correct
the conditions at two state institutions for the mentally retarded, when they should have
known that such conditions were unconstitutionally substandard, would warrant an award of
attorney's fees under the vexatious conduct rule, the court determined that the private
attorney general theory was a more appropriate justification for the award. Id. at 408-09.
6 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
Under this theory, a plaintiff whose suit has resulted in the establishment of a fund for
the benefit of others beside himself may recover his counsel fees from the common fund, thus
preventing the.unjust enrichment of the other beneficiaries at the plaintiff's expense. Trustees
v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1881). Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co, 396 U.S. 375 (1970),
expanded the common fund theory as a basis for recovery of attorney's fees. The Supreme
Court indicated that the crucial factor was the conferring of substantial benefit on a certain
class, whether or not that benefit could be measured in pecuniary terms. Id. at 392. See Note,
Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private
Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 Hastings L. J. 733, 740-41 (1973).
This exception, established by the Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterps.,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), is based on the theory that a litigant who has brought a suit, which
has the ultimate effect of vindicating a strong congressional policy, acts as a ''private attorney
general" and is entitled to recover his counsel fees from the defendant "unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id. at 402.
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Court: (1) the cost of litigation which has conferred substantial
benefit upon a particular class should be spread among the members
of that class lest they be unjustly enriched at the litigant's expense; 9
(2) certain laws expressing strong congressional policy may be en-
forced most effectively through private actions;" and (3) few public
interest suits would be instituted if the individual plaintiffs were
burdened with sole responsibility for the payment of their attorneys'
fees."
Beyond the issue as to whether an award of attorney's fees is
appropriate," there arises the problem of determining the amount
of the award. This comment will focus exclusively upon this
problem—the process of computing an appropriate fee and the
issues involved in assessing the value of an attorney's service in class
actions. Following a . discussion of the traditional rule recognizing
wide discretion in the trial judge to determine a reasonable fee,
recent rules and decisions which have established criteria to guide
the trial court, and which have thus limited the trial judge's discre-
tion in setting a reasonable fee, will be examined. Finally, the
emphasis which should be accorded the following factors will be
analyzed: the amount recovered and the results obtained from the
efforts of the attorney; the number of hours spent by the attorney on
a particular case; and the proper standard by which those hours
should be valued.
I. FASHIONING THE AWARD: TRIAL COURT DISCRETION
The Slipreme Court in the landmark case of Trustees v.
Greenough" mandated that attorney's fee allowances should be
"made with moderation and a jealous regard to the rights of those
who are interested in the fund. " 14
 This standard has been incorpo-
rated in statutes authorizing such fees' 5 and in many decisions' 6 by
a requirement that the fee awards be "reasonable." The test of
reasonableness had been relied upon both as a guide to fixing the
amount of the fee and as a source of judicial discretion." The
determination of a reasonable fee has been traditionally left to the
9
 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
'° See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterps., Inc., 390 U,S. 400, 402 (1968).
'' Id,
12
 See id, at 391-92. For an analysis of the problems faced by the courts in determining
whether an award of attorney's fees is warranted, see Comment, Liability for Attorney's Fees
in the Federal Courts—The Private Attorney General Exception, 16 B.C. Incl. & Corn. L.
Rev. 201 (1975).
13 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
14 Id. at 536-37.
15 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
16 E.g., Figgie Park, 390 U.S. at 402; Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir.
1971); Miller v. Amusement Enterps., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970).
17 See Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 202, 211 (1966).
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discretion of the trial judge,' 8 and the standard for reversal has been
clear abuse of that discretion.' 9 The trial judge is considered, by
virtue of his experience and knowledge, an expert on the question of
reasonableness. 20
One reason for adherence to the American rule generally pro-
hibiting an award of attorney's fees in a civil suit seems to have been
the reluctance of the courts to involve themselves in the inevitable
controversies which would surround the determination of the
award. 21
 Nevertheless, taking cognizance of the equitable consid-
erations which underlie the exceptions to the American rule, courts
have realized that it is their duty to delve into the "delicate, embar-
rassing and disturbing controversy" 22
 which surrounds the evalua-
tion process.
One answer to the problem of ascertaining a reasonable fee has
been proposed by the American Bar Association. In Disciplinary
Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the ABA has
promulgated a loose set of criteria which purport to set forth the
appropriate factors for an attorney to consider in fixing a legal fee. 23
While the criteria mentioned are pertinent to the general issue of
reasonableness and have served as guidelines in a number of recent
' 8
 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1972); Electronics
Capital Corp. v. Shepard, 439 F.2d 692, 693 (5th Cir. 1971).
19
 B-M-G Inv. Co. v. Continental/Moss Gordin, Inc., 437 F.2d 892, 893 (5th Cir. 1971).
20
 Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940). See Wewoka, Okla. v. Banker,
117 F.2d 839, 844-45 (10th Cir. 1941).
21
 See Fleischmann v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); Oelrichs v. Spain,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872). The Court in Fleischmann, while holding that attorney's
fees were not recoverable in a suit brought under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 1051-1127
(1970), did not reject the established exceptions to the American rule, but construed the
Lanham Act as providing an inclusive enumeration of the remedies intended by Congress. 386
U.S. at 719.
-
22 Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 569 (7th Cir. 1951).
23
 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, OR 2-106, which suggests the following
considerations:
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or
clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer would be
left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.
Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include
the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particu-
lar employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee' customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(C) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent
fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
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cases, 24 the guidelines lack clarity of definition and fail to state the
proper emphasis to be given to the various factors. Thus, the
guidelines do not establish firm boundaries within which the discre-
tion of the trial judge must be exercised, as they require little more
than a cursory review of the factors included. Furthermore, without
the inclusion of additional considerations, the ABA guidelines ap-
pear to be inadequate for the resolution of the problems which arise
in determining appropriate fee awards in class action litigation.
A partial solution to this problem may be found in the addi-
tional considerations set forth in the Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion. 25
 The Manual focuses on the problems presented by the pecu-
liar nature of class action suits, where attorneys may be seeking a
windfall recovery from unnamed plaintiffs who have benefitted
from the establishment of a common fund or where a suit, brought
in the public interest and having a significant effect upon the law,
has resulted in no monetary judgment from which the attorneys
might be compensated. The Manual suggests that the award be
large enough to provide an incentive to attorneys to continue their
pro bono work, 26 and yet that it should reflect the principle that
class action suits involve an element of public service and should not
be abused. 27 Both the Manual and ABA Disciplinary Rule 2-106
appear to be attempts to curtail groundless awards and to place
curbs on unfettered discretion of the trial court.
The discretionary power exercised in determining the reason-
ableness of an award is not so broad as to preclude judicial review.
Moreover, appellate courts seem to be increasingly aware of the
potential abuses surrounding class actions. 28 Sensitive to charges
that the attorneys benefit more from class actions than do the
parties, 29
 courts currently are scrutinizing fee awards closely, since
the allowance of seemingly exorbitant awards "bring[s] both the bar
and the bench into public disrepute." 3 ° The controversy surround-
24 E.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974); Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974); Donson Stores, Inc. v.
American Bakeries Co., 60 F.R.D. 417, 419-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Clark v. American Marine
Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 711-12 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971).
25 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice pt. 2, § 1.47, at 63-64 (2d ed. 1974), which provides
standards applicable to class actions:
(1) that in seeking and accepting employment as counsel for a judicially determined
class an element of public service is involved; (2) the representation of the class by
counsel is not a result of private enterprise but results from provision of an opportu-
nity to represent a class by a judicial determination; and (3) the policy of the law in
class actions, including antitrust actions, is to provide a motive to private counsel to
represent consumers and to enforce the laws.
2fi Id. at 64.
27 Id.
28 Id. § 1.41, at 27-32.
29
 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d,Cir. 1968) (Lombard, J.,
dissenting) vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural
Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 Colum. L. Rev. I, 10 (1971). See Note, 16 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 254 (1975).
38
 Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 570 (7th Cir. 1951).
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ing the determination of reasonable fees involves a discrete balanc-
ing process in which the interest of the legal profession in preserving
its "integrity and independence" through the receipt of just compen-
sation for services is weighed against the interests of the public in
securing efficient legal services at less than "windfall" prices. 3 '
Recent cases indicate that appellate courts, in order to
scrutinize carefully the grounds upon which the trial judges have
relied in arriving at an award, are insisting that such grounds be
specifically expressed. For example, in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 32 a suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964," the Seventh Circuit held that the trial court's method of
computation was "so lacking of analysis that it constituted an abuse
of discretion." 34
 Similarly, the Third Circuit in Lindy Brothers
Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 35
found that the district court's "failure to hold an evidentiary hearing
and its failure to follow proper standards in awarding fees to attor-
neys" constituted an abuse of discretion requiring reversal on this
issue. 36 Although in Lindy the district court noted its reliance upon
four factors--the percentage amount of the settlement fund awarded
to the attorneys in similar cases, the size of the recovery, the fees
which the attorneys would receive from their private clients accord-
ing to the terms of the contingency contracts previously executed,
and the time spent on the case by the attorneys 37—nevertheless the
Third Circuit found that the award of one-third of the settlement
fund38
 actually was based on a contingency theory, which it deter-
mined unsuitable to the award's purpose of providing fair compen-
sation for the attorneys' services." The Third Circuit assailed the
lower court's cursory solution of the issue of reasonableness, stating
that "[t]he mere listing of four factors for consideration by the court
makes meaningful review difficult and gives little guidance to attor-
neys and claimants."40 As these cases indicate, appellate courts are
examining carefully the underpinnings of a fee determination, par-
ticularly in actions which result in large monetary recoveries.
It is evident that the appellate courts now require that the
amount assessed be firmly grounded on "proper standards" 41 which
31
 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1974).
52 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974),
33
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
34 502 F.2d at 1322. The trial judge found $5000 to be a reasonable fee, merely stating as
his grounds that he had "considered the efforts expended by the plaintiffs' counsel." Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works, 8 FEP Cases 234, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
38 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'g 341 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
36
 487 F.2d at 170.
37
 Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 341 F.
Supp. 1077, 1089-90 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
38
 Id. at 1089.
39
 487 F.2d at 167.
4° Id. at 166-67.
4
 ' Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 474 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy, 487 F.2d at 170.
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indicate the relationship of the amount of the award to the perfor-
mance of the attorney as well as to the benefits actually conferred by
the suit. The trial courts are no longer free to excercise unsubstan-
tiated discretion. Furthermore, it appears that the growing view is
that the trial court may not gauge the amount of the award by
reference solely to the monetary recovery gained by the client.
II. APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE REASONABLENESS OF
CLASS ACTION AWARDS
The recent decisions of the Second Circuit, in Detroit v. Grin-
nell Corp., 42 and the Fifth Circuit, in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, lnc., 43 are representative of judicial attempts to establish
guidelines for the application of the elusive' concept of reasonable-
ness to the computation of attorney's fee awards. The aim of both
the Fifth and the Second Circuits was to formulate guidelines to
serve as reference points in the trial court's exercise of discretion.
Both courts established criteria which, although differing in certain
aspects, evince similar concern with the policy considerations sur-
rounding an award of attorney's fees.
In its discussion of the proper standards to be applied in for-
mulating a fee award, the Second Circuit in Detroit, manifested its
concern not only(over the potential abuses surrounding awards of at-
torney's fees in class actions, but also over the effects which the
apparent abuses would have on the tarnishable image of the legal
profession.'" In Detroit, three national class actions were consoli-
dated as a private antitrust action. A settlement agreement, exe-
cuted after a three year period of pendency and pre-trial prepara-
tion, provided for the establishment of a settlement fund of $10
million, payable with interest to the plaintiff classes. 45 The federal
district court approved the settlement agreement and awarded at-.
torneys' fees of $1.5 millibn and expenses of $14,918.73, payable out
of the settlement fund. 46
 One group of appellants attacked the large
counsel fee allowance on the ground that the $1.5 million award
evinced the district court's reliance on a contingent fee approach
which, it was contended, was unsuitable in a class action case as a
flat percentage award bears no rational relationship to the value of
an attorney's services.'" The Second Circuit held that the failure of
the trial judge to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the
attorneys' fees award and his failure to base the award on "proper
standards" constituted an abuse of discretion requiring reversal."
495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
43
 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
44
 495 F.2d at 469.
43 Id. at 453-54.
46 Id. at 454.
47 Id. at 468.
" Id. at 473-74.
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The court in Detroit commenced the evaluation of the trial
court's award with the observation that the initial duty of the trial
court is to ascertain the number of hours which the attorney and his
firm have expended on the particular case. 49 The next step is to
place a value on that time. The Second Circuit indicated that the
computation of the monetary value of time spent requires considera-
tion of the manner in which the time was spent and the professional
status of the person whose services were involved—senior or junior
partner, associate, or paralegal. The Second Circuit suggested that a
proper index would be the hourly rate to which "attorneys of like
skill in the area would typically be entitled for a given type of work
on the basis of an hourly rate of compensation." 5 °
As a consequence of its recognition that this mathematical
computation would not necessarily render the resulting fee reason-
able, the Detroit court also considered several "less objective fac-
tors."5 ' The first of these was the "risk of litigation" which the
attorney undertook in representing the party. Detroit indicated that
the determination of the risk factor should be based upon the
novelty and complexity of the issues and the existence of other civil
or criminal cases which might have predicted the result of the
instant litigation. 52 The evaluation of these "tangible" elements of
the risk of litigation factor along with "intangible" elements such as
the probability of ultimate success either on the merits or by settle-
ment would, the court expected, reduce the speculation: "Thus
determined, the litigation risk factor might well be translated into
mathematical terms. "53
The Second Circuit in Detroit was aware that the feasibility of
implementing such a quasi-mathematical formula as a gauge for the
reasonableness of fees depends upon the amount of relevant facts
which the trial judge has at his disposal. Therefore, it concluded
that an evidentiary hearing on the fee issue was a necessity." It
appears that the Detroit court attempted to distill the various factors
which enter into a proper definition of reasonableness into a formula
which might be applied with objective precision, and in this way, to
provide the trial court with a foothold on the somewhat nebulous
requirement of reasonableness.
In contrast to the Second Circuit's attempt in Detroit to devise
an objective formula for the computation of an attorney's fee, the
Fifth Circuit, in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 55
looked to twelve flexible factors to set the boundaries of reasonable-
ness. The Johnson decision, while grounded in the guidelines of the
49 Id. at 470.
'° Id. at 471.
5 ' Id.
52
 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 472, 473.
55
 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Code of Professional Responsibility, elaborates upon those consider-
ations and relates them to public interest class actions. The Fifth
Circuit set aside, as inadequate, an order allowing attorneys' fees of
$13,500 to plaintiffs who had prevailed in a Title VII class action. 56
In reviewing the award, the court noted that the trial judge's order
did not indicate which factors he had considered in fixing the sum,
and that the amount of the award did not bear any relationship to
the number of hours alleged by plaintiffs' counsel to have been spent
on the case," Although the plaintiffs' attorneys had submitted to the
district court affidavits indicating that a total of 659.5 hours, exclu-
sive of three days spent in trial, had been expended upon the case,
as well as a schedule of fees for those hours, the lower court had
apparently disregarded such figures and had based its award on
sixty working days of six or seven hours each, at $200 per day and
three days of trial at $500 per day ($250 for each of two attorneys).
The judge, without explanation, then reduced the hours by an
amount that was between 299.5 and 239.5 hours. 58 The appellate
court, while reserving comment as to the adequacy of the sum, held
that the failure of the lower court to observe proper guidelines in its
determination was sufficient to constitute an abuse of discretion. 59
The Fifth Circuit set forth twelve significant factors which
should be weighed by a court attempting to fix a reasonable fee: (1)
the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
issues; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4)
the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to accep-
tance of the instant case; (5) the customary fee received for similar
work in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the
amount of the recovery involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability . of the attorneys; (10) the "unde-
sirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; (12) awards in similar cases."
Although most of these factors are self-explanatory, some of
them warrant further comment. The time and labor quotient is not
intended as the decisive factor; its purpose is to discern the number
of hours actually expended, and to sift out duplicated work and
unproductive time. 6 ' The Fifth Circuit, preserving the theory of the
trial judge's expertise, 62 stated that "{Ole trial judge should weigh
the hours claimed against his own knowledge, experience, and ex-
pertise of the time required to complete similar activities." 63 Reli-
56 Id. at 720.
57 Id. at 717.
56 Id. at 715-17.
59
 Id. at 720.
60
 Id. at 717-19. These factors are similar to those set forth in the ABA Code, DR 2-106.
See note 23 supra.
' 488 F.2d at 717.
h 3
 See text at notes 19-20 supra.
63 488 F.2d at 717.
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ance upon the trial judge's expertise pervades the twelve criteria
expressed in Johnson since it is the trial judge who must assess the
skill demanded by the case and the attorney's ability.
In setting the particular hourly rate to be awarded for the
work, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a community standard—the fee
typically awarded for similar work in the locality—and insisted that
minimum fee schedules issued by the local bar association also be
considered. In addition, the court suggested that the rates prescribed
in the Criminal Justice Act 64 be implemented as establishing the
minimum hourly rates for cases other than those within the scope of
the Act itself. 65
Johnson further indicates that an agreement between attorney
and client for either a fixed or contingent fee is another factor to be
considered in determining the appropriate award, though it is not
controlling. 66 Such agreements should be employed as aids in estab-
lishing the pecuniary expectations of the attorney and in fixing an
upper limit for the fee which, the court noted, should not exceed the
amount a client may have contracted to pay. 67 While not promoting
a contingency theory of computation, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless
reasoned that the attorney award should reflect the amount of the
recovery to the extent that the recovery sum reflects the result
achieved, or overall success of the suit. The court thus appeared to
give official recognition to an element of "reward," an approach
which may be evident from the Johnson court's directions that
counsel "should be appropriately compensated for accepting the
challenge"68 when the issue presented is novel or so "undesirable"
as to present the possibility of unfavorable repercussions within the
community. 69 On the other hand, the Johnson guidelines are also
designed to discourage the trial judge from granting an exorbitant
attorney's fee."
Both the Detroit and Johnson opinions demonstrate the sensi-
tive balancing process inherent in awarding a reasonable compensa-
tion for an attorney's services in class action litigation. While the
guidelines suggested by each court differ slightly, such variations in
emphasis derive not from diverse philosophical definitions of a
reasonable fee, but from the particular nature of each case and of
the plaintiffs' claims on appeal. In Johnson, the plaintiff appealed to
the Fifth Circuit on the ground that the fee award, allowed by the
district court upon successful resolution of the Title VII class action
case, was inadequate. 71 In Detroit, the appellants, members of the
64
 18	 § 3006A{d)(1) (1970).
65 488 F.2d at 718.
66 Id.
67 Id.
6° Id.
69
 Id. at 719.
7 ° Id. at 719-20.
71
 Id. at 715.
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plaintiff class contending that the common fund created by the
settlement of the antitrust action had been dispensed too generously
by the trial judge, challenged the fee award as excessive. 72 Con-
sequently, in Johnson the court looked to numerous factors, such as
the amount recovered and the results obtained, whereas in Detroit,
the court emphasized consideration of the time and labor required,
which would guard agairist excessive awards. In discussing its
criteria, the Second Circuit skirted any mention of the amount
recovered as a factor which should bear on the size of the counsel
fee, perhaps in reaction to the argument that the $1.5 million figure
evidenced a de facto contingency approach."
The emphasis in Detroit upon devising a quasi-mathematical
formula for the computation of fees is in some ways antithetical to
the twelve loose directives of Johnson, in which the Fifth Circuit
emphasized that it did "not attempt to reduce the calculation of a
reasonable fee to mathematical precision." 74 The Second Circuit's
formula, however, is not fully objective—use of the risk of litigation
factor allows the court to make subjective evaluations of the likeli-
hood of success and the novelty of the issues. In computing the
value of an attorney's time, it will be incumbent upon the judge in
both the Second and Fifth Circuits to make subjective evaluations
of the lawyer's skill and reputation. These evaluations will affect the
judge's determination of the compensation to which a lawyer of like
ability in the community would be entitled. Although the Detroit
court eschewed cumbersome and imprecise standards in setting
fees, 75 and, one surmises, would react similarly to the Johnson
criteria, the Second Circuit's attempt to devise a simple, objective
formula precludes reliance upon five considerations enumerated in
Johnson. Failure to include as relevant factors awards in similar
cases, preclusion of other employment, an agreement with the client
for a fixed or contingent fee, the existence of an established profes-
sional relationship with the client, and the undesirability of the case
in view of community sentiment may present a quandry for the
Second Circuit when faced with a Johnson-like pro bono suit. While
it is possible that courts might construe the risk of litigation factor
enunciated in Detroit as encompassing the Johnson factors where
they are relevant to a particular case, the Detroit opinion does not
clearly provide for such flexibility. Another weakness of the Detroit
opinion is its failure to explicitly mention the importance of the
results achieved, perhaps since it might necessitate consideration of
the amount recovered, as bearing on the success of the litigation,
although it is implied in, the risk of litigation factor. It appears that
the aim of the Detroit court was to hone down an apparently
72
 495 F.2d at 452.
73 Id. at 468.
74
 488 F.2d at 720.
75
 495 F.2d at 470.
639
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERICAL LAW REVIEW
excessive fee by formulating strict, objective guidelines emphasizing
the time expended by the attorneys. While the Detroit criteria were
well-suited to the antitrust suit at issue, their rigidity makes them,
as opposed to the Johnson criteria, of doubtful universal applicabil-
ity.
In Johnson, the court considered, among other factors, the
amount recovered, the result achieved, and the need to reward an
attorney who has successfully litigated a pro bono suit. The Fifth
Circuit, though aware of the danger of excessive fees, seemed
equally concerned that the attorney be justly compensated for the
risks he has taken and the perhaps unpopular causes he has cham-
pioned. 76 The intent of the Fifth Circuit, like that of the Second
Circuit, is to provide the trial courts with concrete guidelines as an
aid in determining attorney's fees while preserving the traditional
discretion of the lower courts. While the approaches adopted by the
Second and Fifth Circuits differ in emphasis, it is evident that both
courts are engaged in a similar balancing process in formulating
criteria which will ensure a fee rationally related to the services
performed by the attorney.
III. SPECIFIC FACTORS IN COMPUTING THE AWARD
In the final section of this comment, the ways various courts
have treated the pertinent considerations and the major policy issues
underlying the standards will be examined. The issues of the ap-
propriateness of a contingency approach, the proper emphasis to be
placed upon the amount recovered or the results obtained, the
importance of the number of hours expended by counsel, and the
proper standard of evaluation of those hours will be analyzed.
A. Amount of Recovery
The importance to be accorded the amount of the recovery is a
controversial issue, particularly in the context of antitrust actions,
which often result in substantial monetary recoveries. Recent cases
have assailed the percentage method of computing fees, whereby the
attorney is awarded a flat percentage of the recovery. Consequently,
they have refused to enforce contingency contracts between the
attorney and the client where an award of attorneys' fees is war-
ranted. 77 While contingency agreements relieve the courts of the
76 488 F.2d at 719.
77 E.g., Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Kiser v. Huge, No. 73-1393 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 1974); Illinois v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1972). As one court emphatically stated:
"Whether or not [the litigant] agreed to pay a fee and in what amount is not decisive. Such
arrangements should not determine the court's decision. The criterion for the court is not what
the parties agreed but what is reasonable." Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp.
709, 711 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971). That courts will not automati-
cally set aside as contrary to public policy such fee agreements between attorney and client
when they have been entered into prior to the litigation is evinced by the court's acquiescence
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burden of assessing the value of each attorney's services, 78 it is clear
that the amounts agreed upon are not necessarily reflective of a
reasonable fee. As one court noted:
A percentage fee gives undue weight to the size of the
recovery. In cases with small recoveries, it completely ig-
nores professional skill and the complexity of the work
involved, and could result in an insufficient award for
services rendered. ... Conversely, where the recovery is
extraordinarily high, it could result in an excessive
award. 79
Besides being divorced from any concept of true reasonable-
ness, fee awards computed on a contingency basis may be totally
inappropriate in class action suits. 8 ° This was demonstrated in Kiser
v. Miller," where the court considered the issue of awarding a fee
as a percentage of the recovery. In Kiser, a class action was brought
to determine the pension rights of retired miners. 82
 Three days after
the entry of a summary judgment order in their favor, the plaintiffs'
attorneys had mailed out consent forms in which they informed the
recipients of the award that counsel would seek one-third of the
total recovery as attorneys' fees. 83
 In refusing to enforce the agree-
ments," the district court declared that the contingency contracts
were void as a matter of public policy and, in any case, the percent-
age requested was "excessive in light of the actual legal services
necessary to succeed in this public interest suit." 83 Instead, the court
computed the basic award by multiplying the number of hours spent
on the suit, discounted by 35%, 86
 times an hourly rate of $40, and
then added a premium equal to 10% of the hourly compensation. 87
to such contracts in Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'g 341 F. Supp. 1077 (E,D. Pa. 1972), where the
attorneys had prior agreements with the clients. 487 F.2d at 164; 341 F. Supp. at 1085.
" See Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 60 F.R.D. 417, 419 (S.D.N.Y,
1973); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
79
 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified on appeal, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hughes Tool
Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
8° See Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
81
 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Kiser v. Huge,
No. 73-1393 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 5, 1974),
82 364 F. Supp. at 1313.
83
 Id. at 1314.
84
 The court found that it could not "in good conscience, enforce a contract made with
class members, who more likely than not, lack the sophistication, experience and education to
act understandingly and deal with their attorneys on an equal basis at arms length." Id. at
1319.
85 Id.
86
 The discount reflected the time spent by the attorneys on the telephone, in conference
among themselves, or on the attorney fee issue, and took into account discrepancies between
the individual lawyers' accounts of the number of hours spent in court hearings. Id. at 1318.
87
 That the premium awarded was a percentage of the hourly compensation is sig-
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The criteria relied upon by the court in Kiser in setting the
amount (although it is not clear whether such criteria were consid-
ered in fixing the hourly rate, the premium percentage, or both)
were: (1) that the questions involved were not novel or complex; (2)
that little risk was undertaken, since an analysis of prior decisions
reasonably predicted the result; and (3) that the actual recovery was
small. 88 Most important, however, were the court's judgments that
membership of the plaintiff-class was "the most underprivileged and
impoverished group in the nation" 89 and that the attorneys had
undertaken the litigation "in the spirit of humanitarianism." 9° The
court's considerations in Kiser, which reflected those enumerated in
the Manual for Complex Litigation," indicate the court's awareness
that class action litigation presents the danger of abuse by un-
scrupulous attorneys whose sole interests lie in receiving windfall
fees. 92 Some tension, however, underlies the award of the premium.
This was demonstrated by the court's attempt to recognize the need
for furnishing incentive to counsel in order to encourage class action
representation, while limiting the amount awarded on account of
the humanitarian motives of counsel and the indigency of their
clients.
As Detroit indicates, the de facto use of a contingency approach
by the judge in the evaluation process may also be proscribed.
There, the court found that the district court judge had not consid-
ered the proper standards93 where, although he professed to have
considered such factors as the work done, the risks taken, and the
public interest nature of the suit, 94 the counsel fee amounted to 15%
of the class recovery. The Second Circuit did recognize that the
traditional contingent fee approach tended to serve as an incentive
for efforts to achieve as large a recovery as possible. Furthermore,
the court noted that emphasizing the time element rather than the
size of the recovery might discourage settlements, since the attorney
might seek to accumulate a high number of billable hours. 95 The
Second Circuit, however, concluded that the inequities of the con-
tingent fee syndrome outweighed the danger of potential abuse of
the legal process and that close scrutiny by the court would reveal
any unscrupulous practices. 96
nificant. In Pete v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, No. 73-1270 (D.C. Cir., Aug.
5, 1974), a companion case to Kiser, the court found excessive a premium of 5% of the total
recovery and remanded the case for. consideration in light of Kiser. Slip opinion at 9.
as 364 F. Supp. at 1318. See text at note 101 infra.
" 364 F. Supp. at 1318.
9D Id.
91 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice pt. 2, § 1.47, at 63-64 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Manual for Complex Litigation].
92 Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 91, § 1.41, at 27-32.
93
 495 F.2d at 470.
94 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1392 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
95
 495 F.2d at 471.
96
 Id.
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While it is clear that any amount is going to reflect some
percentage of the recovery, it is equally clear that an award substan-
tially based on a contingency approach disregards the other relevant
considerations necessary in formulating a reasonable fee, and over-
looks the real value of the benefits conferred by the action. 97 Al-
though a strict contingency approach vitiates any effective inquiry
into a truly reasonable award, the amount recovered and the result
achieved necessarily determine the overall success of the suit. Sev-
eral courts have considered the amount of the recovery as one of the
indices of benefit conferred on the litigants and thus as a factor to be
weighed in the evaluation process. 98 The Second Circuit in Detroit,
faced with an award apparently computed by a percentage ap-
proach, avoided any mention of the amount recovered as a factor
in its guidelines. However, the amount recovered is enumerated
among the twelve Johnson criteria, although it is viewed as a
subsidiary category of the total results achieved. 99 More specifically,
the Fifth Circuit, in Johnson, directed its discussion to cases where
the monetary damages tend to be incidental to the equitable relief
afforded to the plaintiffs. Thus the court concluded that the impor-
tant factor was the "decision's effect on the law," and that the total
results obtained, not only the amount awarded, should be consid-
ered.'°°
The Kiser court took an approach similar to Johnson in that it
focused on the specific results of that suit. In Kiser, plaintiffs were
ensured of success due to the resolution of a prior suit; accordingly,
the court deemed the benefit conferred on the members of the class
to be the difference between the recovery in the prior suit and that
in Kiser, and it was that extra amount which was treated as the
"actual recovery" in the case. 10 ' The Kiser and Johnson approaches
are desirable in that they distill from the absolute recovery the
actual benefit which has been conferred upon the class by virtue of
the particular suit. While the analysis of benefit conferred, measured
in part by the amount recovered, is related to a contingency theory
97
 Reference to the considerations given weight by the trial court in Lindy Bros. Bldrs.,
Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
rev'd, 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), illustrates this assertion. Predicated on the propriety of a
percentage approach, the factors mentioned by the court, with one exception, bear no
relationship to the performance of the attorneys, the nature of the action, or the actual
benefits obtained. The exception was the amount of time spent by the attorneys, but the court
employed this factor solely to compute the hourly rate the attorneys would have received had
their request for one-third of the settlement fund been allowed. 341 F. Supp. at 1090.
' E.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974);
Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168
(3d Cir. 1973); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D, 221, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
In Lindy, the Third Circuit noted that the amount of the recovery "may be the only means by
which the quality of an attorney's performance can be judged where a suit is settled before
any significant in-court proceedings." 487 F,2d at 168.
99
 488 F,2d at 718.
Ion Id .
1 °' 364 F. Supp, at 1318.
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in that the focus is often on the amount of the award, the recovery is
not the sole determinative factor, but merely one of the various
considerations which necessarily enter into the award of a reason-
able fee.
B. Novelty or Complexity of the Issues
Related to the consideration of the amount recovered and the
result achieved is the theory that the fee award should reflect the
novelty or complexity of the issues. In Detroit, the court, though
purportedly adhering to a strict time/value approach, included the
novelty factor as one element bearing upon the risk of litigation.'"
In Johnson, the novelty and difficulty of the issues was one of the
twelve enumerated guidelines to be weighed in view of the particu-
lar circumstances of the case.'"
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee Towne
Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 104 an antitrust suit, rejected the contention
that the award should be augmented because of the novelty of the
issues and stated: "Many cases are unique in one form or another,
and many are extremely complicated and difficult for a trial lawyer
or a court to fathom, and certainly it cannot be contended that the
charge of conspiracy is difficult to prove . . . ." 105 However, an
examination of the case indicates that the rationale underlying the
court's position was its antagonism toward the excessive amount of
the fee award.'" It expressed its concern that antitrust litigation
"might develop into a racketeering practice.""? Moreover, it is
evident that the court did not in fact consider the conspiracy issue a
novel one. Thus, where an issue is hackneyed and there is little risk
of unfavorable resolution, the novelty factor should not enter into
the consideration.'° 8
From a policy viewpoint, it seems important that the novelty
and complexity of the issues be taken into account in the same way
as the amount of recovery. The novelty factor is most crucial in
public interest cases which result in little or no monetary recovery.
In civil rights or environmental suits, the favorable resolution of a
novel question may be the primary result sought. Moreover, it is
fitting that attorneys who demonstrate the initiative to tackle an
original problem be rewarded for their creative efforts, even though
in 495 F.2d at 471.
' 03 488 F.2d at 718; accord, Blankenship v. Boyle, 337 F. Supp. 296, 302 (D.D.C.
1972). See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.24 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting).
104 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951).
'°' Id. at 570.
106 See id. at 569.
07 Id. at 570.
1 " Accord, Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973), where the court spe-
cifically noted that the issues were "neither novel nor complex" and that there was little risk
involved on account of the prior favorable resolution of Blankenship. Id. at 1318.
644
COMPUTING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS
there may be no monetary recovery. It may be argued that the
novelty and complexity of the issues will be reflected in an award
based on the number of hours the attorney must devote to the suit,
as it is likely that the more difficult issues will require more time
than would well-settled ones. However, Johnson seems to reject
such a contention with the suggestion that the attorney "should not
be penalized for undertaking a case which 'may make new law.'
Instead, he should be appropriately compensated for accepting the
challenge." 109 Such a positive approach seems desirable, for what is
reasonable in a particular case depends upon the nature of the
issues, be they novelty or well-settled, complex or exceedingly sim-
ple.
C. Time Expended
A third consideration in the fee determination process is the
importance which should be accorded the number of hours the
attorney expended on the case. Courts have often disagreed as to the
importance of the time factor. Some courts, such as the Second
Circuit in Detroit, where the time element was the objective starting
point in the calculation,'m stress the importance of the time logged
by counsel."' For other courts, including the Fifth Circuit in
Johnson, the time factor is not deemed most crucial," 2 although it
is viewed as one of the factors to be weighed. 13
While undue emphasis on the number of hours spent as the
controlling factor would seem to set a premium on inefficiency,'" it
is certainly a necessary consideration in establishing standards by
which to determine fees. The reason underlying the court's emphasis
on time in Detroit 15 and Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. 116
 may be the fact that the courts in those cases were attempt-
ing to formulate alternatives to the contingency theory as a standard
for attorney fee awards. Thus the court in Harper & Row refused to
apply a contingent fee formula.' 17
 The Kiser solution to the prob-
lems engendered by greatly . emphasizing the number of hours de-
voted to the case was to discount the hours duplicated or spent on
1" 488 F.2d at 718.
" 495 F.2d at 470.
lit E. - .,g Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 339 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir,
1964); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. III. 1972).
112 488 F.2d at 717.
" 3 E.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel,  Co., 467 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1972);
Electronics Capital Corp. v. Shepard, 439 F.2d 692, 693 (5th Cir. 1971); Donson Stores, Inc.
v. American Bakeries Co., 60 F.R.D. 417, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
114 One critic questioned the value of placing too much importance on the number of
hours expended: "[W]hen hours become a criterion, economy of time may cease to be a virtue.
Inexperience, inefficiency; even incompetence will be rewarded." Hornstein, Legal Therapeu-
tics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 658, 660-61 (1956).
115 495 F.2d at 41.
11 ' 1 55 F.R.D. at 224.
117
 Id.
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the telephone." 8 Although such an approach may be undesirable to
the extent that it places an additional burden on the trial judge, who
must not only ascertain the total number of hours worked but must
also evaluate the productivity and efficiency of those hours, it pro-
vides a useful input to the fee determination process.
The time element is one ascertainable indication of the degree
of effort the attorney has expended on the case. While it is a crucial
factor which must enter into the balancing process, it is submitted
that time spent should not be considered determinative. A reason-
able fee ought to be a function of the time factor, but the functional
relationship can only be defined in terms of that particular cir-
cumstances of the case.
D. Rate of Compensation
Once the number of hours actually spent on the case has been
ascertained, the court must confront the related problem of what
value should be assigned as an hourly rate of compensation. As
related to public interest litigation, the problem is two-fold: (1)
whether counsel in a pro bono action should command the same rate
per hour as a "private" attorney; and (2) what standard should apply
in fixing the hourly rate—the free market value of the attorney's
services, a local standard, or the rates suggested by minimum fee
schedules or by the Criminal Justice Act. " 9
While the basic factors which enter into fee determination are
primarily the same whether the client is a single private corporation
or a large indigent class, the problem of compensating pro bono
attorneys requires an analysis of the rationale behind the attorney
fee award; resolution of that analysis hinges upon whether the
attorney should be fully compensated for his services. Though it
may seem obvious that the proper recompense is one which fully
and fairly rewards the attorney for his efforts, several cases have
voiced the opinion that it is not the aim of an attorney fee award to
put the attorney in the same financial position in which he would be
were he employed by a "private" client.' 20 Stressing the public
service element of pro bono work, however, seems to penalize the
attorney for his activities in public interest actions and might result
in a less than thorough job on the part of an unscrupulous lawyer. A
better approach is to award the attorney in a public interest suit an
I" 364 F. Supp. at 1318.
' 19 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970). The Criminal Justice Act sets the rate for court-appointed
attorneys' fees at $30 per hour for in-court work and $20 an hour for work done outside of
court. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (1970).
I 2 ° See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 851 (W.D. Tex. 1973); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Thus one court stressed the public service
element of pro bono work and noted: "The award of attorneys' fees is not intended to make
either the client or the attorney whole, nor by any means fully compensate counsel for the
time expended in this extended and complex litigation." Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. at
851.
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hourly rate which approximates that received for similar work by
private counsel, since in that way, the allowance will meet the test
of reasonableness in the context of legal fees.
Different approaches to the problem of selecting a specific rate
of compensation have been suggested. In Cape Cod Food Products,
Inc. v. National Cranberry Association, 121 Judge Wyzanski de-
scribed one standard employed: "The rate is the free market price,
the figure which a willing, successful client would pay a willing,
successful lawyer."' 22
 That standard, however, is nebulous and, as
one commentator has noted, demands reference to "a market in
which lawyers are accustomed to sharing the profits of risky litiga-
tion by express contracts for contingent fees." 123 Since it has been
suggested persuasively that the contingent fee approach is unjus-
tified in class action pro bond suits, it would be contradictory to
urge that great weight be accorded the amount recovered in setting
the hourly rate. The two cases cited as supporting a free market
standard were, in fact, private antitrust actions not brought primar-
ily in the public interest. 124
Several cases, including Detroit' 25 and Johnson, 126 maintain
that the rate should reflect a local standard, the amount a local
attorney of like skill would command for similar work. 127
 While in
essence a local standard is akin to the free market price since both
refer to the amount a lawyer in the community might charge, the
term seems to remove the bothersome speculation factor implicit in
a free market approach. Basing a fee award on a local standard
seems to best serve the objective of fully compensating attorneys for
their professional services and would necessitate taking into account
an attorney's particular specialization or the peculiar nature of an
especially complex or novel case, as it includes consideration of the
particular skill and knowledge required to achieve the desired ends.
A minimum fee schedule promulgated by the local bar associa-
tion is one way in which the local rate might be ascertained. Al-
though it did not urge absolute adherence to local minimum fee
schedules, the Johnson court suggested that "[a]s long as minimum
121 119 F, Supp. 242 (D. Mass. 1954).
122 Id. at 244. A similar standard—"what it would be reasonable for counsel to charge a
victorious plaintiff"—was employed in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245
F. Supp. 258, 302-03 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
12 ' Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 1597, 1653 (1974).
124 Hanover.Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258, 262 (M.D. Pa.
1965); Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 242 (D. Mass.
1954).
125 495 F.2d at 471.
126 488 F.2d at 718.
122 E.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974); Clark v.
American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 712 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir.
1971).
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fee schedules are in existence and are customarily followed . . . in a
given community, they should be taken into consideration." 28
Where the community does rely on the minimum fee schedule as a
fee standard, it would seem that the bar association's suggestions
would set forth a reasonable rate of compensation for legal work.
Where the minimum fee schedule is not followed as a standard for
setting fees in the community, an amount based on it would not
meet the criterion of a reasonable fee in relation to a local standard.
In addition, basing an award exclusively upon a minimum fee
schedule would not take into account such circumstantial factors as
extremely complex issue's or the skill of the attorney, which would
customarily be expected to increase the award. Reliance solely upon
a minimum fee schedule would in those instances result in an award
of an inadequate amount. One court, realizing the limitations of the
area's minimum fee schedule, rejected it in favor of a more flexible
local standard, voicing doubts that the plaintiff could have received
similar services from a local attorney for less than that prescribed by
the local standard." 9 The best solution might be to refer to the
minimum fee schedules for the limited purpose of indicating the
general range of area fees, but to disallow its use where the amounts
suggested do not accurately reflect a local standard.
Where the award is to a plaintiff who has prevailed in a public
interest suit, particularly one which has resulted in little or no
monetary recovery, several courts have urged that the rate be set by
the amounts prescribed in the Criminal Justice Act. While the
Johnson court advised reliance upon the Act to establish a minimum
award,"° the courts in Sierra Club v. Lynn"' and Wyatt v.
Stickney' 32 adopted it in lieu of the minimum fee schedule of the
local bar associations. The Wyatt court found that statutory stan-
dard applicable, since counsel representing criminal defendants and
those representing public interest litigants are "not motivated by
desire for profit but by public spirit and sense of duty" and since "Mt
is the duty of members of the legal profession to represent clients
who are unable to pay for counsel and also to bring suits in the
public interest."I 33
While reference to the Criminal Justice Act does provide at
least an objective basis for the award, reliance solely upon its
specified rates might prove inadequate without further consideration
of such factors as novelty, complexity, and the skill of the attorney.
The Manual for Complex Litigation, which stresses the factor of
public service involved in public interest actions, also recognizes
that the fee award must be large enough to serve as an incentive to
129
 488 F.2d at 718.
129
 Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 712 (F.D. La. 1970).
130 488 F.2d at 718.
131
 364 F. Supp. at 851.
132
 344 F. Supp. 387, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
133 Id.
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attorneys to continue in that field.' 34 The Kiser court, which took
note of the humanitarian spirit of counsel, 135
 was nevertheless con-
cerned with encouraging the continued endeavors of the attorneys in
pro bono work. The court arrived at a compromise, most suitable in
cases with substantial monetary recoveries, by awarding counsel a
percentage of their total hourly-based fee as a premium. 136
 While
absolute adherence to the rates suggested in the Criminal Justice Act
might serve to discourage involvement in public interest actions, a
supplementary award determined by such variables as the excel-
lence of the legal work, the novelty and difficulty of the case, and
the results obtained would serve the dual purpose of encouraging
pro bono work and mitigating the harsh effects of an across-the-
board fee schedule.
CONCLUSION
As attorney fee awards, based on statutory and judicially-
created exceptions to the American rule, have become increasingly
common, the courts have been faced with the problem of determin-
ing what constitutes a reasonable fee. The various criteria which
have been suggested as factors in the formula contribute to a com-
mon result: the allowance of a sum which is fair compensation for
the attorney's services, substantial enough to encourage further
work in the public interest, yet not a windfall fee bearing no
relationship to the labor expended and the benefits realized. Into
this consideration enter numerous factors, including the number of
hours spent on the case and the value assigned to those hours, the
outcome of the suit, the novelty and complexity of the issues, and
the skill displayed by the attorney.
A survey of these considerations demonstrates that there is no
functional relationship between a fee computed as a percentage of
the amount recovered and a reasonable fee. Too often contingent fee
awards result in grants which are exorbitant in light of the benefit
actually conferred and the services rendered. While the result
obtained—be it monetary or equitable relief—should be one consid-
eration which enters into the evaluation process, a focus solely upon
the size of the recovery vitiates a meaningful assessment of what is
reasonable in a particular situation.
The amount of the fee finally awarded is the result of a balan-
cing process in which the judge must weigh the effect of numerous
factors in light of the particular circumstances of each case. This
evaluation process preserves the traditional discretionary power of
the trial court to set the fee, but requires that that discretion be
grounded on concrete factors which ensure consideration of the
pertinent elements bearing on the reasonableness of an award.
1}4
 Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 91, § 1.47, at 63-64. See note 25 supra.
' 35
 364 F. Supp. at 1318,
13R Id .
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The Johnson criteria.'" proffer flexible guidelines encompassing
a range of considerations which can be weighed and evaluated in a
determination of a truly reasonable fee under any circumstances. In
contrast, the Detroit case, with its emphasis on the time element,
seems to be more suited to a case in which a large monetary award
has been recovered.
The Johnson factors are more adaptable and seem particularly
suited to civil rights or environmental actions, which may result in
little monetary recovery but nevertheless may have much effect on
the law. The Johnson court also placed importance on the time
element, since the number of hours devoted to the case by the
attorney provides an ascertainable basis for the award. However,
the absolute value of the time factor was increased or decreased
according to the relative weight of other factors such as the results
obtained, the novelty of the issues and the undesirability of the
case.' 38 The approach suggested in Johnson exemplifies a solution
which preserves much of the lower court's discretionary power, but
enumerates concrete guidelines for the exercise of that discretion.
While it may be tempting to stress the readily ascertainable
time element, the better view is that it is but one factor to be
weighed in the evaluation process. It is also submitted that the
better approach to setting a rate of compensation would appear to
be reliance on a local standard of rates—a standard which is realis-
tic in terms of client-attorney expectations and in terms of the
customary fee for similar work in the locality.
DEBORAH M. LODGE
137 See text at note 60 supra. The Johnson criteria have been found to constitute the
proper guidelines for determination of attorneys' fee awards in the following cases: Evans v.
Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref.
Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 447 n.19 (5th Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885,
890 n.7 (9th Cir. 1974); Duhon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 494 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir.
1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 607 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d
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